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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. : Supreme Court No. 14223 
EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS, 
INC., 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
000O000 * 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
************* 
Plaintiff-respondent petitions the Court for a 
rehearing in the instant case to consider two points which 
plaintiff-respondent respectfully asserts constitute error 
in the opinion of May 25, 1976: 
I. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL WHICH COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOODS WHICH PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT SUPPLIED WERE UNMERCHANTABLE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF 
U.C.A. 70A-2-3-314 AND, THEREFORE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED 
TO MAKE A CASE FOR BREACH OF THIS IMPLIED WARRANTY WHICH COULD 
GO TO A JURY. 
II. THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, 
U.C.A. 70A-2-315, IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Supreme Court No. 14223 
• 000O000-
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS, 
INC. , 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
000O000 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
************* 
The Court, in an opinion filed May 25, 1976# reversed 
the trial court's granting of a directed verdict for the 
plaintiff. In ordering a new trial on defendant's counterclaim/ 
the Court acted on, it is respectfully submitted, the mistaken 
belief that certain aspects of the law of implied warranties 
were applicable to the facts of the case. Plaintiff petitions, 
for reasons appearing in this Memorandum/ that the Court grant 
a rehearing on this matter so that it might reconsider important 
aspects of the law of implied warranties. 
The Court will recall that this case deals with 
defendant's counterclaim (lodged in response to plaintiff's suit 
on open account) that plaintiff was liable in damages to defendant 
for alleged contamination of processed hog feed. Defendant's 
counterclaim was based solely on theories of express and implied 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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( 
( 
warranties. The Court, agreeing with defendant, stated, "The 
evidence does not show that there was an express warranty by 
the seller so as to bring the transaction within the provisions 
of Section 70A-2-313, U.C.A. 1953." Opinion at 2. 
The Court, quoting from Sections 70A-2-314 and 
70A-2-315, then proceeded to discuss the law of implied warranties, 
reversed the order of directed verdict, and remanded for new 
trial. It is unclear from the opinion on which of the two 
sections the Court relied for reversal, that of implied warranty 
i 
of merchantability or that of implied warranty of fitness for 
particular purpose. Hence, this Petition discusses both warranties. 
It is submitted that careful consideration of the record in this 
case, in light of the true import of the sections on implied 
warranties, leads to the conclusions that: (a) defendant intro-
duced no evidence of the non-merchantability of the feed pellets; 
and (b) the warranty of fitness for particular purpose simply 
does not apply to situations of the sort here involved, where a 
buyer directs a seller to supply the buyer with a particular 
product of the buyer's direct specification, rather than "relying 
on the buyerfs skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable 
goods." (§ 70A-2-315) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WHICH COULD 
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOODS WHICH PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT SUPPLIED 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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WERE UNMERCHANTABLE WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF U.C.A. 70A-2-314 
AND, THEREFORE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO MAKE A CASE FOR 
BREACH OF THIS IMPLIED WARRANTY WHICH COULD GO TO A JURY. 
As discussed in plaintifffs brief at pages 12-31, 
defendant failed to make a case for thejury of breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability for three reasons, any of 
which standing alone would suffice to lead properly to a directed 
verdict for plaintiff. This argument has been made, in brief 
and in oral argument, and appears to have been unconvincing. 
Regarding the first two factors, plaintiff here merely restates, 
if with renewed conviction, its position: (1) defendant pre-
sented no substantial evidence that the transaction was predom-
inantly for the sale of goods, rather than for the pelletizing 
service (combining the meat product provided by defendant with 
plaintifff's grain product selected by defendant); and (2) defen-
dant presented no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could 
find that the contaminant, salmonella, was in plaintiff's 
product at any time prior to its delivery to defendant. 
If plaintiff's case for upholding the directed verdict 
had rested on either or both of these grounds alone, the Court 
could arguably be said to have correctly reversed the trial 
court for its failure to examine evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion for directed 
verdict was made and to resolve every controverted fact in its 
favor. For there was at least some evidence introduced, however 
scanty and however unconvincing to the reasonable juror, that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
could lead to the conclusion that the transaction was predom-
inantly for the sale of goods and that the product was contaminated 
prior to delivery to defendant. 1/ 
It is clear from an examination of the record, however, 
that defendant introduced no evidence whatever that plaintiff 
breached the implied warranty of merchantabilityc Section 70A-
2-314(2) quoted in part by the Court on page 2 of its opinion, 
provides: 
Goods to be merchantable must be at least 
such as (a) pass without objection in the i 
trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of 
fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and (c) are fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used; 
and (d) run, within the variations per-
mitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and 
among all units involved; and (e) are ade-
quately contained, packaged and labeled 
as the agreement may require; and (f) con-
form to the promises or affirmations of 
fact made on the container or lable if any. 
It is elementary that one relying on a warranty of 
merchantability must establish that the goods supplied to him 
were not merchantable. To do so, such a party must show that 
any one of the conditions of Section 70A-2-314(2) was not satis-
fied. Defendant purportedly relied on an implied warranty of 
merchantability, but it introduced no evidence whatever, let 
1/ See Respondent's Brief on pages 21-25 for a description of 
the lack of basis for the only evidence in the record supporting 
defendant's claim of contamination at time of delivery. 
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alone evidence arguably convincing to a reasonable juror, that 
the "goods" supplied to it by the plaintiff were not merchantable 
under the only law relevant, that embodied in Section 70A-2-314(2). 
Indeed, the only evidence bearing on the criteria of merchant-
ability surfaced in plaintiff's counsel's cross-examination of 
two of defendant's witnesses. In each instance, defendant's 
witnesses themselves gave answers tending to establish the mer-
chantability of the pelletized feed product, rather than its 
non-merchantability, even if it did contain the degree of salmon-
ella contamination at time of delivery that defendant asserted 
in its complaint. Such testimony included statements tending 
to show the "goods" would "have passed without objection in the 
trade under the contract description"' (see Tr. 109-110, plaintiff's 
brief at 27); and that the "goods" were "fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used" (see Tr. 192-194, plaintiff's 
brief at 28-29) . 
Because defendant introduced no evidence of the 
pelletized feed product's unmerchantability, it is clear that 
the Court's reversal of the directed verdict cannot properly 
have been based on the claim of breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability. Reasonable minds are given no chance to differ 
on a matter of fact concerning which no evidence has been put 
before them. 
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POINT II 
THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, U.C.A. 70A-2-
315, IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Although, as indicated supra, it is unclear from the 
Opinion whether the Court relied, in reversing the order of 
directed verdict, on the implied warranty of merchantability 
or on the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, 
it appears more likely that the Court relied on the latte^ r. 
Both the evidence presented and the Court1s positioning of the 
reference to the particular purpose warranty (just prior to 
the concluding paragraph) indicate the likelihood of reliance 
by the Court on this warranty theory, rather than on that of 
merchantability. Close examination of the evidence introduced, 
in light of the wording and import of the particular fitness 
warranty, indicates, nonetheless, that this warranty, like that 
of merchantability, is not applicable as a matter of law to 
the facts of this case. The provision on implied warranty of 
fitness for particular purpose, Section 70A-2-315 of the Utah 
Code, provides: 
When the seller at the time of con-
tracting has reason to know any par-
ticular purpose for which the goods 
are required and that the buyer is 
relying on the seller's skill or 
judgment to select or furnish suit-
able goods, there is, unless excluded 
or modified under the next section, 
an implied warranty that the goods 
shall be fit such purpose. (Emphasis 
added) 
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The Court concluded that: 
[i]n the view of the fact that there had 
been a course of dealing between plaintiff 
and the defendant for a period of approxi-
mately two years it must be inferred that 
the plaintiff knew of the purpose to which 
the feed was being put by the defendant. 
Opinion at 2. 
Whether this inference should be indulged, where no evidence 
adduced at trial supports it, is questionable. But further 
pursuit of this particular problem is unnecessary, for the reason 
that another aspect of the agreement makes very clear that the 
particular purpose warranty is excluded as a matter of law in 
this case. The words of the section itself make clear the 
absolute requirement/ for the implied warranty to attach, that 
the buyer must rely on the seller's skill or judgment to select 
or furnish suitable goods. Defendant has conceded, in its brief 
and through its witnesses, that it did not rely on plaintiff's 
skill or judgment. Defendant obtained a standard formula from 
a third party and submitted it to plaintiff for plaintiff's 
application, and further specified that the processed hog feed 
was to come only from plaintiff's Orem feed mill, the very mill 
which had processed, according to the same exact formula, feed 
bought from plaintiff for a number of years preceding the time 
of the relevant transaction. Defendant's brief at 3, Tr. 15-17, 19. 
It thus becomes clear, even from defendant's version 
of the facts, that defendant in no way relied on plaintiff's 
skill and judgment in selecting or furnishing suitable goods. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On the contrary, plaintiff was obliged under contract to provide 
a product conforming to defendants specifications. If plaintiff 
had failed to comply with this condition, it would likely have 
incurred contract liability for breach. Thus to hold plaintiff 
liable to defendant, in this situation, on a particular purpose 
warranty theory would have been to construct around the plaintiff 
a double bind. Damned if it complies with the specifications, 
damned if it does not. Defendant clearly chose not to rely on 
plaintiff's skill and judgment in selecting grain products with 
which defendant's own meat products would be combined to form 
the pellets for consumption, or in selecting the formula accord-
ing to which the products would be combined, or in furnishing 
the product to defendant. Plaintiff agreed to, and in fact did, 
act precisely in accord with defendant's specifications. 
An Official Comment to the Uniform Commercial Code 
section on particular purpose warranty, case law from other 
jurisdictions, and Utah case law itself all echo the conclusion 
appearing from a direct reading of the statute and from common 
sense considerations, that the implied warranty of fitness for 
particular purpose is not applicable to the facts of this case. 
Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 2-315 deals with the 
elimination from the old Uniform Sales Act "patent or other 
trade name" exception to particular purpose warranty. The 
purpose of the elmination was to make it clear that mere refer-
ence in the contract to a particular brand of product will not 
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work of itself to nullify the warranty. The drafters of the 
U.C.C. realized that the seller may have recommended the 
product as adequate for the buyer's purpose prior to the contract's 
execution. It is the reliance by the buyer, in conjunction with 
or apart from the seller's recommendations, on the seller's 
skill or judgment, that triggers the particular purpose warranty. 
Nonetheless, Comment 5 states, relevant to our situation: 
If the buyer himself is insisting on a 
particular brand he is not relying on 
the seller's skill and judgment and so 
no warranty results. (Emphasis added.) * 
It is clear that the instant case involves a buyer's insistence 
on a particular product rather than its reliance on the seller's 
judgment to select or furnish a suitable product. 
The test of when a warranty of fitness for particular 
purpose will be held to have been implied has perhaps most 
clearly been stated as follows: 
The distinction between the cases in which 
a warranty is implied and where it is not 
implied is that in one case a person buys 
a distinct thing, an exact article, and 
gets the thing he bargained for. He cannot 
complain that it does not accomplish the 
purposes for which he purchased, although 
he communicated that purpose to the seller. 
In such cases he takes his own risk as to 
the fitness of the thing for the intended 
purpose and no warranty is implied. . . . 
The other case is where one buys an article 
to be used for a certain purpose, and the 
seller undertakes to furnish him the article 
required. . . . The distinction is between 
the manufacture and supply of an article to 
satisfy a required purpose, and the manu-
facture or supply of a specified, described, 
and defined article. In one case there is 
an implied warranty, and in the other there 
is none. American Player Piano Co. v. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4 
(The fact that this case was decided well before the promulgation 
and enactment of the U.C.C. does not render outdated its explan-
ation of the law of implied warranty. The focus of the court's 
analysis makes clear that then controlling common law warranty 
law was similar in import to the clear meaning of U.C.A. § 70-2-315). 
In another case, one in which the court held that there was no • 
implied warranty of fitness in a sale of a defective loaf of 
bread, Justice Cordozo wrote, "there can be no inference of 
reliance where the buyer selects the brand and gets what he . 
selects." Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 
N.E. 105, 106 (1931). And in a recent case the Tenth Circuit, 
applying Utah law, observed that goods manufactured to a buyer's < 
specifications are not supplied with an implied warranty of 
fitness, "where the buyer furnishes precise technical specifica-
tions." Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp. 451 F.2d 
1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1971). 
The Utah case most similar to the instant case, on 
the particular purpose warranty questions, is Landes Co. v. Fallows, 
81 U. 432, 19 P.2d 389 (1933). There plaintiff sued to recover 
the unpaid balance of a promissory note delivered in part payment 
for certain second hand farm machinery. The defendant-warranty 
claimant specified certain parts that were to be incorporated 
in the machinery which plaintiff was to supply. The defendant 
offered to prove that the parts specified were defective. The 
court held, inter alia, "there is no warranty of fitness where 
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the buyer orders a specific article for a specific purpose known 
to the seller." 19 P.2d at 391-392. The Utah Supreme Court 
has adverted to this aspect of warranty law on three other 
occasions, in Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Paramount 
Baking Co., 88 U. 67, 39 P.2d 323 (1934); in Carver V. Donn, 117 
U. 180, 214 P.2d 118 (1950); and in Finlayson v. Brady, 121 U. 
204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). In each of these cases, all involving 
contractual specifications of certain products by brand name, 
the Court rejected the claims that such brand name specification 
i 
had done away with the element of reliance by buyer on seller's 
skill or judgment. Representative of the particular fitness 
warranty law in effect at the times of those decisions was 
U.C.A. § 81-1-15 (1943), quoted in the Carver case. The statute 
provided, in pertinent part: 
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, 
makes known to the seller the particular pur-
pose for which the goods are required, and it 
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's 
skill or judgment. . .there is an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably 
fit for such purpose. 
(Note that the reliance element is practically identical to that 
of the present statute.) None of these cases abrogates or subtracts 
from the rule announced in the Fallows case. Rather than doing 
away with the rule that there can be no implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose when the buyer affirmatively specifies 
the article he wants, the cases stand for the principle that was 
later to appear in Official Comment 5 (discussed, supra) to 
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U.C.C. § 2-315, that the mere fact that the contract calls for 
the supplying of a product of a particular brand does not 
dictate the conclusion that there was no reliance and hence no 
warranty. The rule of the Fallows case is applicable here, where 
the contract between plaintiff and defendant did not merely 
include a brand name that was suggested to buyer by seller, a 
brand name whose mention was initiated by buyer because it 
happened to occur to him as a generic term, representative of 
the kind of product he thought he wanted (Carver case). If that 
1 
had been the case, defendant would have been situated similarly 
to the warranty claimant in Carver, one who had, despite the desi 
nation in the contract of a product by name, in fact relied on 
the seller's skill or judgment to provide a product suitable 
for his particular purpose. But the record in the instant case 
clearly indicates that there was no such reliance by defendant, 
but rather that defendant, having at least as much expertise in 
the area of product selection as plaintiff, acted affirmatively 
to have included in the contract for sale exact specifications 
for manufacture of the product for which it bargained. Plaintiff 
was given no choice in selection; it was required to, and in fact 
did, provide precisely what defendant ordered. In such case, as 
the foregoing discussion makes clear, there can as a matter 
of law be implied no warranty of fitness for particular purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there was absolutely no evidence introduced 
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that the goods supplied by plaintiff were not merchantable, the 
defendant made no case before the jury on a theory of breach 
of implied warranty of merchantability. Because defendant could 
not, on its own statement of relevant facts, have relied on the 
plaintiff's skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing the 
"goods" involved, the warranty of fitness for particular 
purpose is not applicable in this case. The Court's opinion 
on the facts, although plaintiff strongly asserts that a careful 
reading of the record does not support it, does not require that 
the directed verdict be set aside: 
We are of the opinion that in this case there 
were circumstances shown in the evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably find that the 
contamination contained in the feed came from 
the components furnished by the plaintiff or 
that the contamination was a result of plain-
tiff !s preparation of the feed and that con-
tamination resulted from the processing. 
Opinion at 3. 
As the foregoing argument makes clear, even if the 
record contained evidence of contamination at the time of delivery, 
defendant failed to introduce any evidence at trial that the alleged 
contamination rendered the feed unmerchantable. The only evidence 
adduced indicated that the feed was merchantable within the 
purview of Section 2-314. The argument also makes clear that, 
as a matter of law, no warranty of fitness for particular purpose 
can be implied pursuant to Section 2-315 where the record demon-
strates a complete absence of buyer reliance and an abundance of 
buyer specifications. 
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The Court has correctly ruled there was no express 
warranty- Defendant's case rests, as it must, solely on an 
implied warranty theory. Defendant failed, as a matter of law, 
to make a case for the jury. Rendering justice within the law 
as well as adding another carefully written page to the well-
developing Utah case law on implied warranties requires, it is 
respectfully submitted, reinstatement of the trial court's 
directed verdict. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 1976. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going PETITION FOR REHEARING AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHOR-
ITIES to Philip C. Patterson, Attorney for Defendant Egbert-
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Haderlie Hog Farms, Inc., 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
this 28th day of June, 1976. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
